Contract Powers Registry / base
WELL (Moonwell)
0xa88594d404727625a9437c3f886c7643872296ae on base
In one line: upgradeable proxy (eip1967.implementation); retained powers: burn_others, mint, ownership, pause.
Can this code be replaced?
Yes — this is a proxy. The address you interact with holds no logic of its own; it forwards calls to a second contract. Whoever holds the upgrade right can point it somewhere else, and every behaviour described on this page changes with it.
| Pattern | eip1967.implementation |
|---|---|
| Current logic | 0xbe08a91ade130ad61193be2321ea06c4c39e124a |
| Logic name | xWELL |
| Logic source verified | Yes |
Raw storage evidence (2)
eip1967.implementation→0xbe08a91ade130ad61193be2321ea06c4c39e124aeip1967.admin→0x8d7d2230a2d195f023588edd13dbad56dd69770f
Who holds the keys?
| Owner / admin | 0x8b621804a7637b781e2bbd58e256a591f2df7d51 |
|---|---|
| Found via | owner() |
| That address is | A contract |
owner is a contract — could be a multisig or timelock; this endpoint does not verify which. It could be a multisig, a timelock, or a single-key wrapper — this registry does not open it. Follow the link above to see what that contract can do.
What the privileged role can still do
Each card is a capability found in the code. declared = the contract’s published interface exposes it. bytecode-heuristic = the 4-byte selector appears in the compiled code, which often means the contract implements it — but it can equally be a function this contract calls on another contract. Only a verified source settles that.
Balances can be destroyed
declaredTokens can be burned from an address other than the caller’s own.
Evidence (2)
burn(address,uint256)implementation-abiburn(address,uint256)implementation-bytecode
New tokens can be created
declaredSupply is not fixed by the code — the privileged role can issue more.
Evidence (2)
mint(address,uint256)implementation-abimint(address,uint256)implementation-bytecode
Control can be transferred
declaredThe privileged role itself can be handed to another address, or renounced.
Evidence (4)
renounceOwnership()implementation-abitransferOwnership(address)implementation-abirenounceOwnership()implementation-bytecodetransferOwnership(address)implementation-bytecode
Transfers can be halted
declaredA privileged role can stop activity, including your ability to exit.
Evidence (4)
grantPauseGuardian(address)implementation-abiownerUnpause()implementation-abiunpause()implementation-bytecodepause()implementation-bytecode
Is there a bug bounty on this?
No live bug-bounty program matched this contract’s name in my index (186 Immunefi + 52 Cantina programs, rebuilt daily). Matching is by name, not by address — a program can cover this contract without the names lining up. Browse the full index at Bounty Radar.
Raw facts
| Chain | base (chainId 8453) |
|---|---|
| Contract name | TransparentUpgradeableProxy |
| Compiler | v0.8.19+commit.7dd6d404 |
| License | None |
| Bytecode size | 2,188 bytes (logic: 18,012) |
| DELEGATECALL | present |
| SELFDESTRUCT | absent |
| CREATE2 | absent |
| Explorer | view on block explorer ↗ |
How this was produced, and what it cannot tell you
Storage slots, bytecode and eth_call results were read from public RPC nodes;
where the source is verified, the published interface was read too. Nothing here is copied from another
site’s opinion. Generated in 846 ms on 2026-08-29.
- confidence="declared" means the ABI exposes the function. confidence="bytecode-heuristic" means the 4-byte selector appears in the code — usually its own dispatch table, but it can also be a selector this contract CALLS on another contract. Only a verified ABI settles it.
- admin.ownerType="contract" does not mean multisig — this endpoint does not inspect the owner contract.
- bounty.match="name-heuristic" matches a contract NAME to a program name; it is not proof the address is in scope.
What would change the answer: an upgrade after the date above; a power reachable only through a contract this one trusts; or role-based access control, whose holders this registry does not enumerate. Re-read the chain before you rely on it.
Machine-readable
Same facts as JSON, free, no key: /c/base/0xa88594d404727625a9437c3f886c7643872296ae.json.
Live lookups for any address (not just this list) are $0.05 per call.
Want a human-grade read?
This page is automated pattern-matching. If you need someone to actually read the code and tell you what breaks, I do fixed-scope micro-audits — you pay after you read the report.