Contract Powers Registry / base
USDbC
0xd9aaec86b65d86f6a7b5b1b0c42ffa531710b6ca on base
upgradeable proxy (eip1967.implementation); admin is a 3-of-6 multisig; retained powers: burn_others, mint, upgrade.
Can this code be replaced?
Yes — this is a proxy. The address you interact with holds no logic of its own; it forwards calls to a second contract. Whoever holds the upgrade right can point it somewhere else, and every behaviour described on this page changes with it.
| Pattern | eip1967.implementation |
|---|---|
| Current logic | 0x1833c6171e0a3389b156eaedb301cffbf328b463 |
| Logic name | UpgradeableOptimismMintableERC20 |
| Logic source verified | Yes |
Raw storage evidence (2)
eip1967.implementation→0x1833c6171e0a3389b156eaedb301cffbf328b463eip1967.admin→0xd94e416cf2c7167608b2515b7e4102b41efff94f
Who holds the keys?
| Owner / admin | 0xd94e416cf2c7167608b2515b7e4102b41efff94f |
|---|---|
| Found via | admin() |
| That address is | A contract |
owner is a contract — see admin.controller for what kind. It could be a multisig, a timelock, or a single-key wrapper — this registry does not open it. Follow the link above to see what that contract can do.
What the privileged role can still do
Each card is a capability found in the code. declared = the contract’s published interface exposes it. bytecode-heuristic = the 4-byte selector appears in the compiled code, which often means the contract implements it — but it can equally be a function this contract calls on another contract. Only a verified source settles that.
Balances can be destroyed
declaredTokens can be burned from an address other than the caller’s own.
Evidence (2)
burn(address,uint256)implementation-abiburn(address,uint256)implementation-bytecode
New tokens can be created
declaredSupply is not fixed by the code — the privileged role can issue more.
Evidence (2)
mint(address,uint256)implementation-abimint(address,uint256)implementation-bytecode
Code can be replaced
declaredThe logic behind this address can be swapped for different code. Everything below can change with it.
Evidence (4)
changeAdmin(address)abiupgradeTo(address)abiupgradeToAndCall(address,bytes)abichangeAdmin(address)bytecode-selector
What this page did not categorise
Nothing was dropped. Every state-changing function that the source restricts to a privileged role also matched one of the categories above — 5 of 13 functions in the published interface. The rest are callable by anyone, which is why they are not listed as powers. This is not proof there is no back door: a privileged path reached through another contract this one trusts would not show up here.
Is there a bug bounty on this?
No live bug-bounty program matched this contract’s name in my index (183 Immunefi + 52 Cantina programs, rebuilt daily). Matching is by name, not by address — a program can cover this contract without the names lining up. Browse the full index at Bounty Radar.
Raw facts
| Chain | base (chainId 8453) |
|---|---|
| Contract name | Proxy |
| Compiler | v0.8.15+commit.e14f2714 |
| License | MIT |
| Bytecode size | 2,096 bytes (logic: 7,322) |
| DELEGATECALL | present |
| SELFDESTRUCT | absent |
| CREATE2 | absent |
| Explorer | view on block explorer ↗ |
Has any of this changed?
This page is rebuilt from the chain and diffed against the previous day. If the implementation behind this address is replaced, or the privileged key moves, it is listed on what changed with the before and after — also as RSS, so it can reach you without you coming back.
How this was produced, and what it cannot tell you
Storage slots, bytecode and eth_call results were read from public RPC nodes;
where the source is verified, the published interface was read too. Nothing here is copied from another
site’s opinion. Generated in 3577 ms on 2026-09-19.
- confidence="declared" means the ABI exposes the function. confidence="bytecode-heuristic" means the 4-byte selector appears in the code — usually its own dispatch table, but it can also be a selector this contract CALLS on another contract. Only a verified ABI settles it.
- admin.controller identifies a Safe-style multisig, an OZ timelock, or an owned admin contract by the functions it answers. A contract that answers none is reported as unknown-contract, not as safe.
- bounty.match="name-heuristic" matches a contract NAME to a program name; it is not proof the address is in scope.
- coverage.unclassifiedOwnerOnly lists functions the source restricts to a privileged role but which match no power category here. It is read from the verified source by matching function name + argument count, so an overloaded or inherited function can be attributed imprecisely. When coverage.checked is false the engine could not read the source at all, and the power list must be treated as a floor.
What would change the answer: an upgrade after the date above; a power reachable only through a contract this one trusts; or role-based access control, whose holders this registry does not enumerate. Re-read the chain before you rely on it.
Machine-readable
Same facts as JSON, free, no key: /c/base/0xd9aaec86b65d86f6a7b5b1b0c42ffa531710b6ca.json.
Live lookups for any address (not just this list) are $0.05 per call.
Want a human-grade read?
This page is automated pattern-matching. If you need someone to actually read the code and tell you what breaks, I do fixed-scope micro-audits — you pay after you read the report.