Contract Powers Registry / ethereum
Compound III cUSDCv3
0xc3d688b66703497daa19211eedff47f25384cdc3 on ethereum
In one line: upgradeable proxy (eip1967.implementation); retained powers: pause, upgrade.
Can this code be replaced?
Yes — this is a proxy. The address you interact with holds no logic of its own; it forwards calls to a second contract. Whoever holds the upgrade right can point it somewhere else, and every behaviour described on this page changes with it.
| Pattern | eip1967.implementation |
|---|---|
| Current logic | 0x83d491269720ce925f92c6bf9f66b7a0779a293a |
| Logic name | CometWithExtendedAssetList |
| Logic source verified | Yes |
Raw storage evidence (2)
eip1967.implementation→0x83d491269720ce925f92c6bf9f66b7a0779a293aeip1967.admin→0x1ec63b5883c3481134fd50d5daebc83ecd2e8779
Who holds the keys?
| Owner / admin | 0x1ec63b5883c3481134fd50d5daebc83ecd2e8779 |
|---|---|
| Found via | eip1967.admin slot |
| That address is | A contract |
owner is a contract — could be a multisig or timelock; this endpoint does not verify which. It could be a multisig, a timelock, or a single-key wrapper — this registry does not open it. Follow the link above to see what that contract can do.
What the privileged role can still do
Each card is a capability found in the code. declared = the contract’s published interface exposes it. bytecode-heuristic = the 4-byte selector appears in the compiled code, which often means the contract implements it — but it can equally be a function this contract calls on another contract. Only a verified source settles that.
Transfers can be halted
declaredA privileged role can stop activity, including your ability to exit.
Evidence (1)
pause(bool,bool,bool,bool,bool)implementation-abi
Code can be replaced
declaredThe logic behind this address can be swapped for different code. Everything below can change with it.
Evidence (4)
changeAdmin(address)abiupgradeTo(address)abiupgradeToAndCall(address,bytes)abiupgradeTo(address)bytecode-selector
Is there a bug bounty on this?
No live bug-bounty program matched this contract’s name in my index (186 Immunefi + 52 Cantina programs, rebuilt daily). Matching is by name, not by address — a program can cover this contract without the names lining up. Browse the full index at Bounty Radar.
Raw facts
| Chain | ethereum (chainId 1) |
|---|---|
| Contract name | TransparentUpgradeableProxy |
| Compiler | v0.8.15+commit.e14f2714 |
| License | — |
| Bytecode size | 1,878 bytes (logic: 18,599) |
| DELEGATECALL | present |
| SELFDESTRUCT | absent |
| CREATE2 | present |
| Explorer | view on block explorer ↗ |
How this was produced, and what it cannot tell you
Storage slots, bytecode and eth_call results were read from public RPC nodes;
where the source is verified, the published interface was read too. Nothing here is copied from another
site’s opinion. Generated in 1326 ms on 2026-08-29.
- confidence="declared" means the ABI exposes the function. confidence="bytecode-heuristic" means the 4-byte selector appears in the code — usually its own dispatch table, but it can also be a selector this contract CALLS on another contract. Only a verified ABI settles it.
- admin.ownerType="contract" does not mean multisig — this endpoint does not inspect the owner contract.
- bounty.match="name-heuristic" matches a contract NAME to a program name; it is not proof the address is in scope.
What would change the answer: an upgrade after the date above; a power reachable only through a contract this one trusts; or role-based access control, whose holders this registry does not enumerate. Re-read the chain before you rely on it.
Machine-readable
Same facts as JSON, free, no key: /c/ethereum/0xc3d688b66703497daa19211eedff47f25384cdc3.json.
Live lookups for any address (not just this list) are $0.05 per call.
Want a human-grade read?
This page is automated pattern-matching. If you need someone to actually read the code and tell you what breaks, I do fixed-scope micro-audits — you pay after you read the report.