Contract Powers Registry / polygon
Aave v3 Pool (Polygon)
0x794a61358d6845594f94dc1db02a252b5b4814ad on polygon
In one line: upgradeable proxy (eip1967.implementation); retained powers: mint, sweep, upgrade.
Can this code be replaced?
Yes — this is a proxy. The address you interact with holds no logic of its own; it forwards calls to a second contract. Whoever holds the upgrade right can point it somewhere else, and every behaviour described on this page changes with it.
| Pattern | eip1967.implementation |
|---|---|
| Current logic | 0x6030db989d47cd74fc17bb6f4fcd3a8b29fee57e |
| Logic name | PoolInstance |
| Logic source verified | Yes |
Raw storage evidence (1)
eip1967.implementation→0x6030db989d47cd74fc17bb6f4fcd3a8b29fee57e
Who holds the keys?
no owner()/getOwner()/admin() responded — access control may use roles (AccessControl) or be renounced Access control may use role-based permissions (OpenZeppelin AccessControl), or it may have been renounced. This registry does not enumerate role holders.
What the privileged role can still do
Each card is a capability found in the code. declared = the contract’s published interface exposes it. bytecode-heuristic = the 4-byte selector appears in the compiled code, which often means the contract implements it — but it can equally be a function this contract calls on another contract. Only a verified source settles that.
New tokens can be created
declaredSupply is not fixed by the code — the privileged role can issue more.
Evidence (1)
mintToTreasury(address[])implementation-abi
Tokens can be pulled out
declaredA rescue/sweep path exists that moves tokens held by the contract.
Evidence (1)
rescueTokens(address,address,uint256)implementation-abi
Code can be replaced
declaredThe logic behind this address can be swapped for different code. Everything below can change with it.
Evidence (4)
upgradeTo(address)abiupgradeToAndCall(address,bytes)abiupgradeTo(address)bytecode-selectorupgradeToAndCall(address,bytes)bytecode-selector
Is there a bug bounty on this?
No live bug-bounty program matched this contract’s name in my index (186 Immunefi + 52 Cantina programs, rebuilt daily). Matching is by name, not by address — a program can cover this contract without the names lining up. Browse the full index at Bounty Radar.
Raw facts
| Chain | polygon (chainId 137) |
|---|---|
| Contract name | InitializableImmutableAdminUpgradeabilityProxy |
| Compiler | v0.8.10+commit.fc410830 |
| License | GNU AGPLv3 |
| Bytecode size | 2,400 bytes (logic: 21,146) |
| DELEGATECALL | present |
| SELFDESTRUCT | absent |
| CREATE2 | absent |
| Explorer | view on block explorer ↗ |
How this was produced, and what it cannot tell you
Storage slots, bytecode and eth_call results were read from public RPC nodes;
where the source is verified, the published interface was read too. Nothing here is copied from another
site’s opinion. Generated in 1820 ms on 2026-08-29.
- confidence="declared" means the ABI exposes the function. confidence="bytecode-heuristic" means the 4-byte selector appears in the code — usually its own dispatch table, but it can also be a selector this contract CALLS on another contract. Only a verified ABI settles it.
- admin.ownerType="contract" does not mean multisig — this endpoint does not inspect the owner contract.
- bounty.match="name-heuristic" matches a contract NAME to a program name; it is not proof the address is in scope.
What would change the answer: an upgrade after the date above; a power reachable only through a contract this one trusts; or role-based access control, whose holders this registry does not enumerate. Re-read the chain before you rely on it.
Machine-readable
Same facts as JSON, free, no key: /c/polygon/0x794a61358d6845594f94dc1db02a252b5b4814ad.json.
Live lookups for any address (not just this list) are $0.05 per call.
Want a human-grade read?
This page is automated pattern-matching. If you need someone to actually read the code and tell you what breaks, I do fixed-scope micro-audits — you pay after you read the report.